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TERRITORIALITY: FOR AND AGAINST
Reuven S. Avi‐Yonah
The University of Michigan

1. Introduction
US‐based multinational enterprises (MNEs) currently have about $1.7 trillion “permanently
reinvested” offshore. Most of this immense pile of cash is located in low‐tax jurisdictions so that
under current law repatriating it would result in a 35% tax on the dividend without an offsetting
foreign tax credit.
There is no doubt that this “trapped income” phenomenon is a problem: The various ways in
which MNEs have attempted to repatriate the funds without triggering a dividend tax (e.g., by
manipulating the short‐term loan exception to IRC section 956, as documented in a recent
Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations hearing) show that there is a real desire to
repatriate but that the dividend tax is a serious deterrent. Thus, the tax on dividends from the
active income of Controlled Foreign Corporations (CFCs) meets the criteria for a bad tax: It raises
little revenue but significantly affects taxpayer behavior in undesirable ways.
There are two opposing solutions to this problem. The first, as envisaged by various
Congressional proposals (e.g., by Chairman Camp and Sen. Enzi) as well as by a long series of
commissions (e.g., Bowles‐Simpson) is to adopt territoriality, i.e., not tax the dividend when it is
repatriated (except perhaps for a small tax in lieu of disallowing deductions incurred to earn the
exempt income). The second, as suggested by numerous Administrations from Kennedy to
Obama and by many other commentators, is to abolish deferral and levy a current tax on the
active income of CFCs. Which one is better?
This article will survey the main arguments for and against territoriality and conclude that it is
the wrong way to go in the short run, but can perhaps be adopted in the medium to long run in
conjunction with more fundamental international tax reform. The main reason that territoriality
should not be adopted now is that the OECD may be about to recommend worldwide
consolidation for all its members as part of the Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) project,
and if the OECD does that, all of the standard arguments in favor of territoriality and against
abolishing deferral disappear.
2. Why Do we Tax Corporations?
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Before delving into the territoriality debate, I think it is helpful to step back and consider why we
have a corporate tax to begin with. In a perfect world I think it would be better to only subject
individuals to taxation and not have a tax on legal entities. But there are two reasons to tax
corporations: (a) If we don’t, rich individuals could park their income inside corporations and
obtain deferral, (b) corporations are very important players in the economy and Congress likes
to use the corporate tax to regulate their behavior.
In theory we could subject individuals to mark to market on corporate shares and regulate
corporate behavior by other means, but both steps seem politically unrealistic. Thus, the
corporate tax is likely to survive as both an anti‐deferral device and as a regulatory tax.
If those are the goals of corporate taxation, in my opinion they support worldwide taxation of
US‐based MNEs and are inconsistent with territoriality because (a) if we adopt territoriality rich
individuals could invest in US‐based MNEs and know that their foreign earnings benefit from
deferral, (b) if we adopt territoriality we can only regulate the US portion of the MNE and the
foreign portion can have as much of an impact on the US economy as the US portion.
It can be argued that these reasons also support taxing foreign‐based MNEs on worldwide
income because US individuals can invest in foreign‐based MNEs and foreign‐based MNEs can
impact the US economy as well. But (a) we cannot tax foreign‐based MNEs on foreign source
income under accepted jurisdictional norms, (b) taxing US‐based MNEs is better than not taxing
any MNEs on worldwide income from both an anti‐deferral and a regulatory perspective, and (c)
it may be possible, as discussed below, to achieve both ends if other OECD members also tax
their MNEs on worldwide income.
Let us now examine the arguments for and against territoriality in more detail.
3. Arguments for Territoriality
a. Everybody Does It
The first argument in favor of territoriality is that it has become the OECD norm. Since the
UK and Japan adopted territoriality (narrowly defined as exempting dividends from active
income upon repatriation), the US is now left as the only major economy to tax its MNEs on
a worldwide basis with deferral. This situation, it is said, violates “capital ownership
neutrality” because it means that US‐based MNEs may face a higher tax burden on
investments in a third country than MNEs based in another OECD jurisdiction. That, in turn,
could lead to the less efficient foreign MNE making the investment rather than its US
counterpart.
b. Competitiveness
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The main argument derived from the above is that US MNEs are currently in a competitive
disadvantage vis a vis MNEs from another OECD jurisdiction. Thus, it is said, we need to
adopt territoriality in order to level the playing field. Implicit in this argument is the
assertion that the US should aid US MNEs because they bring more benefits (e.g., jobs) to
the US economy than foreign MNEs.
c. Inversions
Another argument in favor of territoriality is that if we deviate too much from the
international norm current US‐based MNEs will have an incentive to migrate to other
jurisdictions. While the enactment of IRC section 7874 in 2004 stopped the first wave of
migrations, a new wave is occurring now (Aon and five others since early 2012) because of
the desire to avoid the US worldwide taxing jurisdiction. Avoiding 7874 requires a real
presence in a foreign jurisdiction, but arguably US‐based MNEs are willing to undergo such
real migrations and even have top management relocate overseas. If we go further and
abolish deferral, such migrations will become even more common and new corporations will
not be founded in the US. In general, corporate residence is not a very meaningful basis for
our international tax system and we should not base the tax consequences entirely on
whether the parent is incorporated in the US or elsewhere.
4. Arguments against Territoriality
a. Profit Shifting
The main argument against territoriality is that it will encourage even more profit shifting to
offshore jurisdictions. Currently, the main deterrent against profit shifting is that it is
impossible to bring the funds back without incurring the tax and that it is necessary for
financial reporting purposes to convince an auditor that the funds are in fact permanently
reinvested offshore to avoid a reserve for the future tax on the dividend. These deterrents
disappear once territoriality is adopted.
The various Congressional proposals all contain various anti‐shifting provisions. My favorite
is Rep. Camp’s option B which ties exemption to the effective tax rate in the foreign
jurisdiction, which is what most other OECD countries do. But it is unclear whether these
provisions will be enacted and whether they are tough enough to deter shifting (Camp’s
proposal only kicks in if the foreign effective rate is below 10% and contains a significant
exception for real presence in the foreign jurisdiction).
Such incentives to shift profits offshore reduce the US corporate tax base and violate CEN,
and there is no consensus in the economics literature that CON is clearly more important
than CEN.
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b. Competitiveness
The counter‐argument to the competitiveness issue is that the empirical evidence suggests
that US‐based MNEs do not bear a higher effective worldwide tax burden than their
European counterparts, even though EU‐based MNEs benefit from territoriality and US‐
based MNEs do not. The reason is presumably because EU‐based MNEs are subject to CFC
rules that are tougher than the increasingly porous Subpart F, which has become relatively
toothless following the adoption of check the box and the subsequent enactment of IRC
954(c)(6) (the CFC to CFC payment exception to Subpart F).
While it may be true that abolishing deferral would put US‐based MNEs at a competitive
disadvantage, this by itself is an argument for keeping the current rules in place, not for
adopting a version of territoriality that gives US‐based MNEs a competitive advantage over
both EU‐based MNEs and US domestic corporations.
c. Cooperation
While inversions may be a serious concern, I believe that it may be possible to stop them by
adopting a corporate exit tax at the corporate level (as opposed to the IRC 367 shareholder
level tax, which proved ineffective, or the loophole‐ridden IRC 7874). In addition, I would
adopt a “managed and controlled” standard for corporate residency so that an inversion
would require a real move by the CEO and top management team. The combination of these
two measures will raise the bar for inversions quite high.
More importantly, the OECD Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) study indicates that the
OECD may be on the verge of doing something significant about profit shifting, such as
recommending abolition of both deferral and exemption for all OECD‐based MNEs. If that
were to happen, all the arguments in favor of territoriality disappear because (a) we will be
following OECD practice in abolishing deferral, so that CON is not an issue; (b) there will be
no competitive disadvantage if we abolish deferral, since everyone else will too; (c)
inversions to other OECD countries will be fruitless.
5. Conclusion
I support worldwide taxation of US‐based MNEs because it seems to me congruent with the
reasons we tax corporations, as explained above. On the other hand, I have also been dubious
that a regime that depends so crucially on whether a given MNE is US or foreign based can
survive in a globalized world.
This ambivalence leads me to different conclusions in the short and long run. On one hand, I
believe that adopting territoriality now would be a mistake because we want to see where the
OECD BEPS project leads. If it can lead to all OECD members taxing their MNEs currently on a
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worldwide basis, then all of the standard arguments in favor of territoriality disappear because
they all depend crucially on the assumption that our major trading partners have adopted
territoriality.
On the other hand, in the longer term I would be supportive of a different sort of territoriality:
Real territoriality, in which each country only taxes the corporate income that belongs to it. In
my opinion this is congruent with the reality that corporate residence is not very meaningful in a
globalized world and therefore source based taxation of corporation is better than residence‐
based taxation. But that kind of territoriality requires allocation of profits by formula, which is a
much more radical departure from current norms as embodied in the tax treaties and therefore
cannot be done in the short term.
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